Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Truth and Meaning' and 'Things and Their Parts'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]