10 ideas
14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |