10 ideas
| 8698 | Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend] |
| 9557 | Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara] |
| 10263 | Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman] |
| 19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
| 5673 | If we have a pain, we are strongly aware of the bodily self [Cassam] |
| 5670 | Knowledge of thoughts covers both their existence and their contents [Cassam] |
| 5671 | Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| 5672 | Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam] |
| 5675 | Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam] |
| 5674 | We can't introspect ourselves as objects, because that would involve possible error [Cassam] |