63 ideas
12926 | Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz] |
12903 | Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz] |
12914 | Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
12920 | There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz] |
12319 | What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz] |
18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
12922 | A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz] |
18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
12745 | Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz] |
12921 | Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz] |
12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
12916 | A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz] |
12919 | Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz] |
12923 | Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz] |
12704 | Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz] |
19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
13077 | Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz] |
12908 | Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz] |
12706 | Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz] |
12906 | Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz] |
18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
12905 | I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz] |
19334 | I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz] |
5033 | Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz] |
12913 | Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz] |
13089 | To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz] |
5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
12925 | Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz] |
12927 | Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz] |
15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
12924 | Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz] |
12909 | Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz] |
5030 | Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz] |
12912 | Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz] |
12917 | The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz] |
12918 | Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz] |