Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 2 (Basic Laws)' and 'Externalism/Internalism'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
13886 Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
9845 We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
10019 Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
9886 Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
9889 Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
10553 A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett]
10020 Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
9887 Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett]
8751 Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
19347 Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9891 The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19712 Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19703 Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19705 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid]
19706 Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid]
19707 Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
19709 Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
19704 Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
19710 With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19711 Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9890 The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
11846 If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege]