Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Representation and Reality' and 'The Morality of Happiness'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam]
Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam]
If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
"Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam]
Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam]
Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam]
Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam]
Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 3. Cyrenaic School
Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
"Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam]