32 ideas
| 15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
| 15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
| 19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
| 15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
| 15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
| 15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
| 6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
| 15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
| 6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
| 15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
| 6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |