57 ideas
| 14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
| 14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
| 14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
| 14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
| 19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
| 14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
| 14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
| 14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
| 14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
| 14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
| 14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
| 14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
| 14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
| 14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
| 14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
| 14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
| 14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
| 14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
| 14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
| 14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
| 14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
| 14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
| 22849 | Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet] |
| 22848 | People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet] |
| 22838 | Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet] |
| 22846 | The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet] |
| 22835 | Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet] |
| 22831 | Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet] |
| 22839 | Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet] |
| 22847 | Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet] |
| 22821 | Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet] |
| 22834 | Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet] |
| 22822 | Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet] |
| 22841 | Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet] |
| 22842 | For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet] |
| 22830 | Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet] |
| 22829 | Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet] |
| 22836 | 'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet] |
| 22837 | Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet] |
| 22844 | First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet] |
| 22840 | Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet] |
| 22843 | Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet] |
| 22845 | Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet] |
| 22828 | The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet] |
| 22825 | The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet] |
| 22823 | The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet] |
| 22827 | Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet] |
| 22826 | From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet] |
| 22832 | Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet] |
| 14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
| 14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
| 14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
| 14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
| 14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
| 14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
| 14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |
| 14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |