9 ideas
17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
8979 | Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons] |
8981 | Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons] |
8973 | Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons] |
17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |