Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Relations', 'Letters to Frege' and 'Without Immediate Justification'

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12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
13365 Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
10711 Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21354 It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
21353 Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
21352 'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9127 Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8851 Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8849 Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8853 Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8855 Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8852 In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
7531 We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]