Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Relations', 'Letters to Frege' and 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]