Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Relations', 'Philosophy of Language' and 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Interesting philosophers hardly every give you explicitly valid arguments [Martin,M]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
An error theory of perception says our experience is not as it seems to be [Martin,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]