Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case against Closure (and reply)', 'Consistency and realism (with 1972 note)' and 'Truth-maker Realism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

9 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18469 God might necessitate that something happen, but He is not the truth-maker for it [Smith,B]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19544 Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
19545 We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
19546 Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
19547 Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
19548 The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
19549 P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
19550 We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22454 We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]