11 ideas
20752 | For man, being is not what he is, but what he is going to be [Ortega y Gassett] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
6445 | You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
20756 | Instead of having a nature, man only has a history [Ortega y Gassett] |