31 ideas
9136 | The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen] |
9131 | Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen] |
9139 | If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen] |
9140 | Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen] |
9119 | No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen] |
9135 | We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen] |
9125 | Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen] |
9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
9116 | Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen] |
9132 | An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen] |
12732 | Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz] |
9128 | It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen] |
9130 | Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen] |
9118 | The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen] |
9124 | We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen] |
19544 | Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske] |
19545 | We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske] |
19546 | Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske] |
19547 | Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske] |
19548 | The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske] |
19549 | P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske] |
19550 | We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske] |
9126 | Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen] |
9121 | Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen] |
19438 | Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz] |
19415 | Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz] |
9134 | The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen] |
9133 | Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen] |
9129 | I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen] |
19439 | God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz] |
9122 | God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen] |