Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Epistemic Operators', 'Causation and Laws of Nature' and 'Mathematics without Numbers'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
14600 Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
14603 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14607 T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
8698 Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend]
9557 Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara]
10263 Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
14604 If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
14599 Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
14605 Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14601 Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14606 Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
6445 You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose]