18 ideas
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |