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All the ideas for 'Thus Spake Zarathustra', 'An Outline of Philosophy' and 'Dispositions'

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73 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental [Mumford]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge [Mumford]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We only really love children and work [Nietzsche]
Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford]
It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods! [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche]
We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche]