19 ideas
23664 | Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid] |
23669 | Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid] |
23666 | It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid] |
7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
23665 | Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid] |
23668 | Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid] |
7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
4422 | The end need not be the goal, as in the playing of a melody (and yet it must be completed) [Nietzsche] |
8383 | Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane] |
23667 | Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid] |
23670 | Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid] |
23671 | Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid] |