Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Genealogy of Morals', 'Conditionals' and 'The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages'

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67 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
The main aim of philosophy must be to determine the order of rank among values [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Scientific knowledge is nothing without a prior philosophical 'faith' [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objectivity is not disinterestedness (impossible), but the ability to switch perspectives [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten]
'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Psychologists should be brave and proud, and prefer truth to desires, even when it is ugly [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack]
Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten]
Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski]
Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski]
Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady]
Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski]
Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten]
For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham]
Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski]
Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski]
Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack]
Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H]
A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski]
Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read]
Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki]
Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten]
Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee]
Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Forgetfulness is a strong positive ability, not mental laziness [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Philosophers invented "free will" so that our virtues would be permanently interesting to the gods [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
People who think in words are orators rather than thinkers, and think about facts instead of thinking facts [Nietzsche]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
We must question the very value of moral values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
The concept of 'good' was created by aristocrats to describe their own actions [Nietzsche]
A strong rounded person soon forgets enemies, misfortunes, and even misdeeds [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
All animals strive for the ideal conditions to express their power, and hate any hindrances [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Only the decline of aristocratic morality led to concerns about "egoism" [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche rejects impersonal morality, and asserts the idea of living well [Nietzsche, by Nagel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Basic justice is the negotiation of agreement among equals, and the imposition of agreement [Nietzsche]
A masterful and violent person need have nothing to do with contracts [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Guilt and obligation originated in the relationship of buying and selling, credit and debt [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
If we say birds of prey could become lambs, that makes them responsible for being birds of prey [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Modern nihilism is now feeling tired of mankind [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Old tribes always felt an obligation to the earlier generations, and the founders [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
The state begins with brutal conquest of a disorganised people, not with a 'contract' [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Punishment makes people harder, more alienated, and hostile [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The truly great haters in world history have always been priests [Nietzsche]