Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Wanderer and his Shadow', 'To be is to be the value of a variable..' and 'De Re and De Dicto'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The end need not be the goal, as in the playing of a melody (and yet it must be completed) [Nietzsche]