Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Birth of Tragedy', 'The Nature of Existence vol.2' and 'A Subject with No Object'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy begins in the horror and absurdity of existence [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen]
Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen]
Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe]
The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]