13 ideas
| 7848 | Philosophy begins in the horror and absurdity of existence [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
| 1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
| 18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
| 1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
| 8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |