12 ideas
| 22076 | Being is only perceptible to itself as becoming [Schelling] |
| 22074 | We must show that the whole of nature, because it is effective, is grounded in freedom [Schelling] |
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 22075 | Only idealism has given us the genuine concept of freedom [Schelling] |
| 6029 | Whoever knows future causes knows everything that will be [Cicero] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |