Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Of Human Freedom', 'The Limits of Contingency' and 'Phil Applications of Cognitive Science'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Being is only perceptible to itself as becoming [Schelling]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
We must show that the whole of nature, because it is effective, is grounded in freedom [Schelling]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Only idealism has given us the genuine concept of freedom [Schelling]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]