10 ideas
9764 | Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy [Quine] |
9763 | For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary [Quine] |
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
20959 | Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |