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All the ideas for 'Dialektik', 'The Will to Power (notebooks)' and 'works'

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141 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist [Nietzsche]
Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz]
Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche]
There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer]
Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber]
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM]
We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré]
Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt]
Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful) [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche]
Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche]
The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche]
The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche]
The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche]
The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche]
We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche]
The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche]
'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche]
Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche]
Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche]
Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche]
Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber]
Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber]
The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 10. Closure of Physics
Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche]