37 ideas
7396 | Hobbes created English-language philosophy [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
16638 | The qualities of the world are mere appearances; reality is the motions which cause them [Hobbes] |
16688 | Evidence is conception, which is imagination, which proceeds from the senses [Hobbes] |
7405 | Experience can't prove universal truths [Hobbes] |
16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
20959 | Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher] |
7408 | It is an error that reason should control the passions, which give right guidance on their own [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
7407 | Good and evil are what please us; goodness and badness the powers causing them [Hobbes] |
7410 | Self-preservation is basic, and people judge differently about that, implying ethical relativism [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
7409 | Hobbes shifted from talk of 'the good' to talk of 'rights' [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
7411 | The attributes of God just show our inability to conceive his nature [Hobbes] |