59 ideas
| 8220 | Philosophy is in a perpetual state of digression [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 8217 | Philosophy is a concept-creating discipline [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 8242 | Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 8223 | The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 8247 | Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| 8224 | 'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
| 10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| 8246 | Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 8219 | Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
| 10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
| 10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
| 10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
| 13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
| 10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
| 10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
| 7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| 10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| 8221 | We cannot judge the Cogito. Must we begin? Must we start from certainty? Can 'I' relate to thought? [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| 8222 | Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 8218 | Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| 8248 | Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 8245 | The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
| 8243 | Atheism is the philosopher's serenity, and philosophy's achievement [Deleuze/Guattari] |