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All the ideas for 'What is Philosophy?', 'Principia Mathematica' and 'Two-Dimensional Semantics'

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74 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy must abstract from the senses [Newton]
Philosophy is in a perpetual state of digression [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a concept-creating discipline [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science [Deleuze/Guattari]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari]
Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Newton developed a kinematic approach to geometry [Newton, by Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
Quantities and ratios which continually converge will eventually become equal [Newton]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
We cannot judge the Cogito. Must we begin? Must we start from certainty? Can 'I' relate to thought? [Deleuze/Guattari]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
If you changed one of Newton's concepts you would destroy his whole system [Heisenberg on Newton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton]
We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
From the phenomena, I can't deduce the reason for the properties of gravity [Newton]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Newton's four fundamentals are: space, time, matter and force [Newton, by Russell]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Mass is central to matter [Newton, by Hart,WD]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
An attraction of a body is the sum of the forces of their particles [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions [Newton, by Baron/Miller]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
You have discovered that elliptical orbits result just from gravitation and planetary movement [Newton, by Leibniz]
We have given up substantial forms, and now aim for mathematical laws [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
I am not saying gravity is essential to bodies [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Newton reclassified vertical motion as violent, and unconstrained horizontal motion as natural [Newton, by Harré]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
Inertia rejects the Aristotelian idea of things having natural states, to which they return [Newton, by Alexander,P]
Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum [Newton, by Papineau]
1: Bodies rest, or move in straight lines, unless acted on by forces [Newton]
2: Change of motion is proportional to the force [Newton]
3: All actions of bodies have an equal and opposite reaction [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Newton's idea of force acting over a long distance was very strange [Heisenberg on Newton]
Newton introduced forces other than by contact [Newton, by Papineau]
Newton's laws cover the effects of forces, but not their causes [Newton, by Papineau]
Newton's forces were accused of being the scholastics' real qualities [Pasnau on Newton]
I am studying the quantities and mathematics of forces, not their species or qualities [Newton]
The aim is to discover forces from motions, and use forces to demonstrate other phenomena [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Newton showed that falling to earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same [Newton, by Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Early Newtonians could not formulate conservation of energy, having no concept of potential energy [Newton, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Absolute space is independent, homogeneous and immovable [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Newton needs intervals of time, to define velocity and acceleration [Newton, by Le Poidevin]
Newton thought his laws of motion needed absolute time [Newton, by Bardon]
Time exists independently, and flows uniformly [Newton]
Absolute time, from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish negative from positive values of time [Newton, by Coveney/Highfield]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
If there is no uniform motion, we cannot exactly measure time [Newton]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
If a perfect being does not rule the cosmos, it is not God [Newton]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The elegance of the solar system requires a powerful intellect as designer [Newton]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Atheism is the philosopher's serenity, and philosophy's achievement [Deleuze/Guattari]