Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Are Freedom and Equality Compatible?', 'Sets, Aggregates and Numbers' and 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making'

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25 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18335 There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18339 The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18333 Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18342 Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
18341 Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
18343 Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18338 Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
18350 Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17818 How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau]
17822 Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
17817 Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
17815 We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau]
17821 You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
18336 Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
21733 The right-wing conception of freedom is based on the idea of self-ownership [Cohen,GA]
21739 Plenty of people have self-ownership, but still lack autonomy [Cohen,GA]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
21736 It is doubtful whether any private property was originally acquired legitimately [Cohen,GA]
21734 It is plausible that no one has an initial right to own land and natural resources [Cohen,GA]
21735 Every thing which is now private started out as unowned [Cohen,GA]