11 ideas
6405 | Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling] |
7527 | Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
22302 | Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter] |
7526 | Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |