Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Judgement', 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism' and 'Philosophy of Mathematics'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
6405 Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
7527 Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
23445 Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
23447 In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
23443 The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo]
23444 To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
23446 You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
23448 Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
23441 Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
23442 Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
22302 Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
7526 Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]