34 ideas
| 13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
| 13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
| 13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
| 13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
| 13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
| 13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
| 13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
| 13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
| 13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
| 13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
| 13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
| 13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
| 13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
| 13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
| 13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
| 13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
| 13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
| 13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
| 13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
| 13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |
| 20041 | Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe] |
| 20712 | God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B] |
| 20701 | Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B] |
| 20702 | The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B] |
| 20703 | How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B] |
| 20694 | 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B] |
| 20706 | A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B] |
| 20707 | The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B] |
| 20708 | If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B] |
| 20710 | Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B] |
| 20711 | A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B] |
| 20709 | The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B] |
| 20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
| 20699 | Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B] |