Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causality and Determinism', 'What is Philosophy?' and 'The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages'

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56 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophy is in a perpetual state of digression [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a concept-creating discipline [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science [Deleuze/Guattari]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten]
'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten]
Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski]
Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski]
Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady]
Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski]
Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski]
Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten]
For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham]
Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski]
Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski]
Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack]
Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H]
A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski]
Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki]
Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach]
Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari]
Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee]
Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
We cannot judge the Cogito. Must we begin? Must we start from certainty? Can 'I' relate to thought? [Deleuze/Guattari]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Atheism is the philosopher's serenity, and philosophy's achievement [Deleuze/Guattari]