Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causality and Determinism', 'New system of communication of substances' and 'The Language of Morals'

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13 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]