Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content', 'Probability and Logic of Rational Belief' and 'Vagueness: a global approach'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
23548 Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
23539 Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
6368 If my ticket won't win the lottery (and it won't), no other tickets will either [Kyburg, by Pollock/Cruz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
23544 Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
23540 Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
23546 Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
23542 Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
23541 Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
23545 We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
23547 It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
23543 We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K]