32 ideas
| 7454 | Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher [Hacking] |
| 3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
| 3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
| 7447 | Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking] |
| 7448 | Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking] |
| 7449 | Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking] |
| 3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 7450 | In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking] |
| 7451 | Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking] |
| 7452 | An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection [Hacking, by PG] |
| 7459 | Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths [Hacking] |
| 3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
| 3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
| 3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
| 3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
| 3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
| 3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
| 3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
| 3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
| 3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
| 3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
| 3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
| 3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
| 3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
| 3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |