Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content', 'Mechanism, purpose and explan. exclusion' and 'Elbow Room: varieties of free will'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
3798 An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
3801 Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
3802 Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3795 Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
14470 Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
3797 I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3803 Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett]
3800 You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
3791 Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett]
3794 Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
3796 The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]