45 ideas
| 3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
| 3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
| 7334 | Anti-realism needs an intuitionist logic with no law of excluded middle [Dummett, by Miller,A] |
| 3303 | For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA] |
| 3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
| 3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
| 3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
| 3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
| 3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
| 3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
| 3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
| 3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
| 3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
| 3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
| 3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
| 3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
| 3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
| 3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
| 3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
| 3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
| 23590 | Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer] |
| 23578 | Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer] |
| 23564 | Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer] |
| 23568 | If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer] |
| 23581 | The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
| 23567 | Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer] |
| 23570 | The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer] |
| 23571 | States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer] |
| 23582 | Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer] |
| 23580 | States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer] |
| 23588 | With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer] |
| 23572 | Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer] |
| 23587 | Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer] |
| 23577 | Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer] |
| 23593 | Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer] |
| 23573 | For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer] |
| 23589 | Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer] |
| 23614 | Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer] |
| 23574 | The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer] |
| 23575 | We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer] |
| 23584 | Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer] |
| 23579 | Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer] |
| 23586 | What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer] |
| 23591 | If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer] |
| 23592 | We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |