43 ideas
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
17621 | What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett] |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
10537 | The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett] |
10542 | To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett] |
13639 | Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro] |
10554 | Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett] |
21557 | Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Quine, by Lackey] |
10552 | Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett] |
10540 | We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett] |
10515 | Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
10544 | The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett] |
10546 | We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett] |
10548 | The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett] |
10281 | The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett] |
10532 | We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett] |
10534 | 'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett] |
10541 | Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett] |
10545 | Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett] |
10555 | If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett] |
10543 | Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett] |
10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
10531 | There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett] |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
10549 | Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett] |
10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |