Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content', 'works' and 'A Theory of Universals'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


26 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics of tradition is sympathetic, hermeneutics of suspicion is hostile [Ricoeur, by Mautner]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]