Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content', 'Hymn to Perfect Wisdom' and 'The Philosophy of Mathematics'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
7911 Theory vanishes when one has obtained wisdom [Rahulabhadra]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
9193 ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett]
9194 The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
9195 Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
9186 First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
9187 Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
9191 Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
9192 The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]