40 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |