Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content', 'Necessary Truth' and 'The Passions of the Soul'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
4577 There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3654 The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
4015 For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
4313 Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham]
23989 There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
20037 Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
16763 We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
4016 Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C]