12 ideas
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
| 6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
| 6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
| 6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
| 21799 | We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen] |
| 6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |