Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Natural Faculties', 'Reference and Definite Descriptions' and 'Realism and Anti-Realism'

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10 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Metaphysical realists are committed to all unambiguous statements being true or not true [Dummett]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
We just use the word 'faculty' when we don't know the psychological cause [Galen]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]
A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan]