14 ideas
| 2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
| 2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
| 2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
| 2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
| 2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
| 2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
| 2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
| 20582 | World government needs a shared global identity [Oksala] |
| 20568 | The principles Rawls arrives at do not just conform to benevolence, but also result from choices [Oksala] |
| 20578 | Anarchists prefer local and communal government [Oksala] |
| 20574 | Utilitarianism neglects responsibility, duties and rights [Oksala] |
| 8338 | A phenomenalist about objects has to be a regularity theorist about causation [Strawson,G] |