Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reference and Contingency', 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making' and 'On the General Idea of Proof Theory'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18335 There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18339 The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18333 Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18342 Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
18341 Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
18343 Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18338 Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
18350 Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
13827 Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
13826 Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
18336 Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
14895 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11881 Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P]