14 ideas
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
8921 | Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman] |
8922 | Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman] |
16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |